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PROPOSEO IIUTLl!lUNGSYS!l!RUIFOR CRASH-FIRE PREVENTION SYSTEMS
By Jacob C. Moser and Dugald O. Black
The initiating system described in this report was designed to meet
the requirements of such a system as determined by a study of data ob-
tained from full-seal.eeqerimental. and accidental airplane crashes. An
example of the application of these requirements in the design of an
initiating system for a twin-engined piston-powered airplane is given.
The proposed system can be designed so that it acts rapidly and so
that accidental operation is improbable. In addition, if the system
should op=ate accidentally, catastrophic results are also improbable.
This system is selective in that it inerts only those damaged zones where
combustibles are spilled. The system can he used on all airplanes whether
they are powered by reciprocating, turboprop,
.
ImRoDumolv
or turbojet e~ines.
Research has shown (ref. 1) that many airplsme crash fires can be
prevented by a crash-fire prevention system. Such a system includes an
initiating system, which detects that conditions for crash fire exist and .
turns on an inerting system, which suppresses the ignition sources that
can ignite spilled combustibles. Suppression of the ignition sources is
accomplished by cooling the hot metal of the engine exhaust system, dis-
charging a fire-extinguishing agent into the engine induction system,
shutting off the flow of fuel and oil to the engines, and deenergizing
the electrical system of the airplane. The inerting system is described
in detail in references 1 and 2. This report discusses a proposed ini-
tiating system for crash-ftie-prevention systems.
An initiating system may be designed so that the pilot must initiate
its action or such that it is completely automatic with a manual override.
The system also maybe designed to react only to crash damage that can lead
to fire or to react to any impact. l?inally,the system may be designed
select and inert only
occur or to inert all
mote from the dsmage.1
the-zone adjacent to-&e da&e in which fire may
—
zones cmying potential ignition sources however
to
re-
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Erom the study of a variety of approaches to the design of initiat-
ing systems, the form proposed in this report is considered to meet the
requirements of rapid and reliable actuation while largely avoiding the
hazards associated with accidental functioning. These hazards stem from
the fact that one step h the 3nerting procedure for nacelle ignition
sources involves shutting off fuel flow to the engine. Therefore, the
proposed initiating system activates only that part of the fire-prevention
system that inerts ignition sources local to crash damage where fire is
likely. The remainder of the airplane can function in the normal way.
An alternate approach to the design of initiating systems would be
to cause all elements of the fire-prevention system on the airplane to
function simultaneously in the event of crash damage anywhere on the air-
plane. However, in view of the fact that power is lost from all engines
ti such a system, accidental operation of the fire-prevention system raises
the danger of a serious accident. For this reason detailed study of in-
itiating s~tems of this type was not made.
Because the proposed system actuates the inerting system only in
those zones where fire may occur, it allows the airplane to fly with the
benefit of fire protection after striking an obstacle on takeoff or land-
ing. In addition, after the airplane makes a belly landing and there
is no need for further fli@t, then the entire inerthg system could be
actuated eith= automatically or mamally.
Several requirements must be met in the design of an initiating sys-
tem. These requirements are dictated by the speed with which a fire can
occur after a crash, the sequence of events that lead to a fire, and the
fact that the fire-prevention system must not hinder either the normal or
emergency operation of the atrplane. These requirements will be similar
for all airplanes whether they are powered by reciprocating, turboprop,
or turbojet engines.
An initiating system for a crash-fire-preventionsystem must be able
to de$ect the presence of airplane damage that may lead to fire. It must
then actuate that portion of the prevention system that suppresses the
poteqtisl hazard in time to prevent the fire.
.
The requirements of this initiating system we discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
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Detecting Damage Leading to Combustible Spillage
The initiating system should detect only crash damage that creates
combustible spillsge since a crash ftie cannot occur if a combustible is
not spilled. Combustible spillage may occur when an engine breaks out of
its mounts and ruptures fuel and oil lines, when the propeller-reduction-
gear housing of the engine is broken as the propeller strikes obstacles,
and when the fuel tadss are penetrated, for example, by trees, buildings,
or the airplane Ifuuiinggear. The initiating system should not, there-
fore, detect crash damage that will not lead to combustible spillage.
For example, minor collisions that may damage a wing tip, dent a wing
leading edge, or wrinkle the belly skin should not be sensed.
Inerting Selected Parts of Airplane
The initiating system should trip the inerting system only in those
airplane zones where cotiustibles have been spilled. This selective
inerting of damaged zones allows the airplane to fly with the benefit of
fire protection after striking an obstacle. For example, if an airplane
1 strikes an obstacle that penetrates the fuel tanks in one wing, that part
of the electrical system in the wing not needed for emergency airplane
operation should be shut off at once to prevent arcs, sparks, and hot
,
wires from starting a fire. However, the engine adjacent to the damaged
fuel tanks need not be stopped at this time. Fuel tim the ruptured wing
will not spread spanwise outside the wing during flight, and th=e is
little chance that the fuel will reach an ignition source in the nacelle
if the wing is properly bdkheaded.
In some airplanes, however, fuel may travel through hot-air ducts or
passageways in the ~ to ignition sources in the engine nacelle or
fuselage (conibustionheaters or heat exchangers). Shutoff systems must
be installed in these hot-air ducts or passageways to prevent this flow,
or the ignition sources must be suppressed.
If, on the other hand, an engine is so damaged that conibustiblesare
spilled in the nacelle, this engine should be shut down and the ignition
sources in this nacelle suppressed. Other engines need not be shut down,
but can provide power for continued flight.
Actuation of Entire Fire-Prevention System When Airplane
r.
If, subsequent to an accident, the airplane makes a wheels-up crash
.
landing and there is no further need for engine power, the entire fire-
prevention system should act. This step is necessary because fuel spilling
.. —- ------ .. ...— —
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from ruptured wing tanks can spr~ forwsrd and spread spanwise as the
airplane slows down and may reach ignition sources in an engine nacelle.
Deenergizing of Electric
System
The fire-prevention system
Power Circuits of
After Actuation
Fire-Prevention
should not in itself become an ignition
source . It is desirable after fire-prevention measures have been started
to remove electric power from all fire-prevention-system circuits that
have been actuated, since these electric wires may also be damaged or
broken in the crash and thus bemme ignition sources.
Immediate and Automatic Action
A reqtiement equally as important as those already described is
that the initiating system should act immediately and automatically .
because fire can occur quickly under certain circumstances. Immediate
actuation is necessary because of the proximiw of combustibles to the
many ignition sources in the engine nacelle of all present-day a5rplanes, ‘
regardless of the type of powerplant used. These ignition sources must
be sup~essed before they have been reached by fuel, oil, hydraulic
fluid, or alcohol spilling from broken tubing or storage tanks if fire
is to be prevented.
Automatic actuation is necesssry %ecause many of the ignition sources
in the engine nacelles and wings can start a crash fire faster than the
crew can sense that conibustibleshave been spilled and trip the inerting
system. The inclusion of humau reaction time would allow some ignition
sources time to start a fire.
The need for rapid automatic action of the fire-prevention system
has been shown by the experimenlml crashes. In these crashes, some fires
started withim O.1 second after impact (r&. 2). For example, fires
occurred when the engine induction system was torn open ~osing the en-
closed fuel-air mixture to the ignition sources in the naceld.e. During
the course of this crash-fire study, the induction system was torn open
in 6 of the 42 engines involved. The frequency with which the induction
systems were damaged indicated that this potential source of crash f@es
cannot be ignored.
Breaking the propeller-reduction-gearhousing away from the power
section is another crash event that can result in fire almost immediately.
In a piston-engine-airplane crash, for example, the ltirtcating oil from
a damaged propeller-reduction-gearhousing can be carried by the airstream
,.
over the outside of the engine to the exhaust system. In the experimental
crashes, the reduction-gear housings on the piston engines were ruptured
in 8 of the 42 engines involved.
—. .
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Similar circumstances can occur in turboprop nacelles. For example,
all four propeller-reduction-gearhousings were broken during a crash
of a turboprop airplane at London, England. In another crash of a-similar
airplane at Chicago, Illinois, the propeller-reduction-gearhousings were
broken in two of the four engines. Teertig open the reduction-gear hous-
ing spills oil into the engine inlet of some turbopropeller engines where
it can be carried into the engine to stsrt a fire.
The initiating system must also act rapidly when an obstacle pene-
trates the wing, breaking the electric wiring and tearing open the fuel
tanks. When fuel tanks =e torn open, fuel is released in the immediate
vicinity of electric UCS or sparks that are formed when the electric
wiring is broken or grounded. Consequently, fire can occur very quickly.
The incandescent filaments of landing lights that are normally present
during a landing or tskeoff at night can also Q@te spilled fuel if the
surroundingbulb is broken. Ignition of fuel spilled in the wingby the
incandescent filaments of a landing light was observed inan experimental
crash (ref. 2).
Prevention of Accidental Operation
The ftie-prevention system should not be actuated accidentallyby a -
malfunctioning switch or short circuit in the initiating system. Acci-
dental operation could easily cause a crash by stopping the engine of an
airplane at a critical time during takeoff or landing. The initiating
system canbe so designed that a short circuit developing in a switch or
in the electric wiring would not actuate the entire inerting system or
anypsrt of it.
The Air Transport Association of America as well as others is COn-
cerned about the hazard that can result from the accidental operation of
any crash-fire-preventionsystem that can shut down all engines at the
same time. The proposed initiating system was planned to take this haz-
ard into account.
Manual Control and Monitoring
Provisions shouldbe made for manual actuation of the fire-prevention
system. The system shouldbe so manged that it can be actuated msnually,
because not aU situations that lead to fire canbe detected automatically
without making the initiating system unduly sensitive and, hence, subject
to potential accidental operation. For example, if a fuel tank is torn
. open in flight, the initiating system trips only the inerting system in
this fuel-tank zone. AU engines would continue to run. Subsequently,
when the pilot makes a normal landing, the initiating system will not
. trip the rest of the inerting system since no other damage has occurred.
.- . .. - ..—-— — — . .—— __ ..- —— —— _.—-— ..
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Fuel escaping from the ruptured fuel tsnk can move forward and spanwise
as the airplane slows down, huwever, and reach ignition sources in an
operating engine nacelle. Because the fuel will not reach these ignition
sources for a few seconds after touchdown, the crew can trip the entire
fire-prevention system after a safe landing is assured. Also, while the
airplane is in normal flight, there may be times when the crew would
went to turn off electric power to the crash-fire-preventionsystem.
This action reduces the possibility of accidental operation during normal
flight.
Means for monitoring the system are desired to inform the crew when
switches have closed or portions of the system are malfunctioning. An
indication on the monitoring system that a switch has closed tells the
crew that dsmgerous damage has occurred or that a switch is malfunction-
ing. A crew check can then determine whether a malfunction is involved.
If malfunctioning is involved, this portion of the system can be iso-
lated while protection is still providedby the remainder of the system.
The monitoring system should also be able to detect an imminent short
circuit so that this part of the system can be isolated. Methods for
providing this degree of monitoring and control have been devised with-
out undue complexity.
EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION TOA TU’IN-ENGINEDAIRPIAIW
In this exa&le, it is assumed that the airplane ispoweredby two
reciprocating engines, the fuel,is stored in the wings, part of the wing
fuel tanks are located above or near the main landing gear, and the laad-
m gear, whenbrokenina crash, can rupture these fuel tanks.
The proposed initiating system is shown diagrammatically in figure
1. This block diagram shows how the various initiating switches sre in-
corporated into the ftie-prevention system and indicates the electric
interconnectionsnecessaryto satisfy the requirements for the initiating
system. The monitoring, manual.control, andinertingpower cut-off cir-
cuits have been deleted to s@lify the diagram.
In order to satisfy the requirement that the initiating system detect
crash dsmage that will cause combustible spillage, switches would be lo-
cated as follows: a switch in each nacelle to detect engine breakout,
a switch to detect when the propeller-reduction-gearhousing is broken out
of the nose section of each engine, a switch to detect when each main land-
= g= is tom out, w a ~t~ i.nfront of each fuel-tank zone to
detect when a fuel tank might be damaged.
The engine.brealmut switch indicates when the crash impact has moved “
the engine enmghthat the fuel and oilpluzibing lines are liable to be
broken. Because there is usually some slack in the flexible fuel and oil
lines, the engines will have consi-ble movement before these lines are
broken. The designer thus has considerable freedom in selecting the value
of the algine movement that will actuate such a switch.
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1.
The switch should not operate
operation. Further, it ShO~ not
-J peller blades with the ground. It
cient engine movement has occurred
A switch similar in principle
7
during either normal or rough engine
operate upon minor impact of the pro-
should op=ate, however, before suffi-
to break the fuel and oil lines.
to the engine-breakout switch proposed
above was installed betwe-a the-mounting ring and the engine for ‘m ‘&-
perimental crash as shown in figure 2. This switch actuated with a for-
ward or aft engine movement of 0.17 inch. The switch consisted of a
microswitch operated by a notched spring-loaded shaft. The entire assem-
bly was mounted in a box. The engine movement was detected by installing
the switch body on the engine mounting ring with the spring-loaded shaft
bearing on a plate which was fastened to the engine. Excessive .foreward
or aft engine movement would move the shaft far enough away from its
center position that the slant sides of the notch would move the lever of
the microswitch and close it.
In tests with this switch, fore and aft engine movememts up to 0.03
inch w=e recorded during normal engine operation. With rough engine
operation, the fore md aft engine nmvement was no more than that during
normal engine operation.
_ ~@ _ q=ation~ fie -i= move-
ment increased in a rotary direction instead of fore and aft. During
these crash tests, fore and aft engine movements from 0.25 to 0.29 inch
.
were measured when the prupeller blades struck an abutmant of railroad
ties and dirt. This propeller impact was fairly severe and produced in-
cipient failure of the engine mounts but did not break oil and fuel lines.
It appears, then, that a switch setting of 0.25 inch wpuld be adequate
for this specific engine installation.
The propeller-reduction-gear switch, shown on the block diagram
(fig. 1), indicates when the propeller-reduction-gearhousing of the en-
gine breaks a- from the power section. A switch similar to that used
to detect engine movement could le used for this.purpose. A proposed
method of installing such a switch on the reduction-gear housing is shown
in figure 3. The switch body would be fastened to the flange on the power
section of the engine with the spring-loaded shaft resting on the reduction-
gear housing. This location was chosen because, in the ~-mental
crashes, the reduction-gear housings always broke away from the pow=
section at this flange.
The landing-gear switch (fig. 1) indicates wh& the landing gecm is
torn out and fuel mey spill fito the *eel well. One method of installing
such a switch is shown in figure 4. This switch asseniblyconsists of a
cable attached to the landing gear in such a way that it a@ates the
suitch when the landing gear is torn off.
.
The fuel-tank-penetration swi@h (fig. 1) indi-tes wh~ the wing “
has been penetrated, thus indicating that a fuel tank may be torn open
.
. . —. ...—.— — ——— -—. —.—— —.- -- —.—
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spilling fuel and breaking electric wiring. This switch is essentially
the same as the engine-breakout switch =cept that a cable is attached to
the notched spring-loaded shaft as shown in figure 5. The complete switch ‘
was installed inside the wing. The cable was supported at intervals along
the spar in front of the fuel tanks as shown in figure 6. Crash tests of
this switch showed that this cable should be located fsr enough ahead of
the frent spar to allow the =ble to close the switch before the obstacle
has reached the spar. However, the cable should be far enough behind the
leading edge of the w5ng so that minor impacts such as a bird striking
the wing will not close the switch. The switch should also be located
close to the bottom of the wing to detect a pen&ration that could be
produced by a slanted obstacle or one that does not pierce the entire .
leading edge of the wing. It is very important that the wing fuel-
tank-penetration switch be cdble operated so that electric wiring for
the switch need not be csm’’iedin front of the fuel tanks. Eliminating
the wiring prevents the sparks or arcs that would occur if’this wtring
were broken.
The electric wiring normally carried in the ting in front of the
fuel tauks may also be an ignition source when it is broken. Even after
the inerting system has disconnected the wiring from power sources and
grounded the circuits, an W-1 of about O.1 second is needed to re-
energize these electric circuits (ref. 1). The distance between the
leading edge of the wtng and the fuel tanks in most airplanes is too
small to allow this much time, even If electric circuits were deener-
gized at the moment the leading edge strikes an obstacle. Therefore, it
is recommended that, whenever possible, this electric wiring be moved
to the rear of the w3mg bebind and near the top of the rear spar. It is
also suggested that this wiring be sheathed. The sheathing can consist
in placing the electric wiring in loose, elastic, heat-resisting sleeves
that would remain intact under tension until the wiring inside breaks.
In this way, any arc resulting from a break in the electric wiring will.
be shielded from conibustibleswrbil the arcing has subsided.
.
These four switches, then, detect the various ways in which damage
can occur and result in ccnibustiblespillage, if au airplane of the type
assumed crashes.
In order to obtain selective Ming, the second requirement, the
initiathg switches are electrically connected to the fire-prevention
system in such a way that only the inerting system local to the airplane
damage is actuated. M figure 1, the line from the engine-breakout and
reduction-gear-housingswitches indicates that the switches actuate the
inerting system for that nacelle in which these switches have been in-
stalled and send a signal to the arming control box. Likewise, if the
landing gear is damaged, the landing-gear switch i.nertsthe nacelle into .
which the landing gear retracts and also sends a signal to the arming
control box. The landing-gear switch is provided only in those airplanes
,
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where landing-gear damageis Ukely to produce conhstible spillage. !l!he
fuel-tank-penetration switch deenergizes, in the damaged wing, those
electric cticuits not needed for emergency operation of the airplane.
This selective inerting protects the zones adjacent to the crash damage.
The next requirement is to actuqte the entire inerting system after
the pilot has flown the airplane to a landing area, a wheels-up crash
~ -S be= madez ~ e@ne POW= is no longer needed. This ground
contact cam be sensed by contact pressure switches, which are commercially
available. The switches are in strip.form and can he fastxmed to the
underside of the atrplane at any location. A contact pressure of 150
pounds per square inch ~ place on the strip closes the electric
circuitl
A signal in the arming control box from one of the four initiating
switches previously described can be conibinedwith signals from two ground-
contact switches (fig. 1). These conibinedsignals, when recieved in the
total-inerting control box (fig. 1), activate the entire fire-prevention
system which then suppresses all remdning ignition sources on the air-
plane l For example, if an engine-breakout switch, propeller-reduction-
gear switch, landing-gear switch, or a wing fuel-tank-penetration wit ch,
and any two ground-contact switches have been closed, the entire inerting
s~stem will act.
The requirement for simultaneous signals from two ground-contact
switches in conjunction with a siggal from one othew initiating switch
prevents the entire inerting system from functioning while the ~lane
is still in the air. “Bird strikes,” minor collisions with trees, flying
debris from the runway, and so forth, ~ close a single ground-contact
switch, but it is extremely unlikely that @u switches would be closed
simultaneously if these switches are located properly.
The proper positions of the contact pressure switches on an airplane
and the nuniberneeded depend upon the ai@lane configuration. On any
airplane, however, the switches must be located in such a way that two of
the switches will close when the airplane is on the ground. This must
occur when any one or any combination of landing gear is retracted or
torn off. “ In addition, these switches should be placed so that impact
with a pule or tree will not close two switches at the same time. Placing
the switches near each other, either laterally or longitudinally,would
allow a single pole to close both switches before the airplane landed.
The contact pressure switches should also be installed with the
electric leads entering the fuselage behind the switch instead of in
front of it. Installed in this way, there will be time for the switch to
close and send a signal before the switch is tarn completely away from the
airplane.
. . . . ..—----- .-...— ____ _.
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switches is shown by
NACA.TN 3774
.
would fix the position and rnuiberof ground con-
the airplane chosen as an example. The switch
positions chosen are shown schematically b fi~e 7. The two contact
pressure switches A on the underside of each nacelle would close if the
airplane landed with the enttie l=ding gem retracted or torn off. To
satisfy the condition of two ground-contact switches being closed when one
main landing gear is retracted or torn off, a nacelle switch and a switch
on one
if one
switch
side of the belly at the rear B form the
mati landing gear and the nose gear have
and a switch on the fuselage nose C make
pair. In a similar way,
been torn out, a nacelle
up the pair.
coI?cLuDmREMARKS
The initiating systexnproposed in this report meets the requirements
for rapid and reliable actuation of the inerting syetem while largely
avoiding the hazards associated with accidental functioning. The initi-
ating system discussed in this report is based upon the use of mechanically
simple switches that detect linear movement or contact pressure and avoids
the use of inertia and frangible switches. Switches of these types were
tested in experimental crashes. Experience showed that in order for in-
ertia switches to operate rapidly enough to trip the iperting system with- ‘“
in the allow&ble time, the sensitivityto acceleration mustbe high. With
high sensitivity, the switches maybe operated accidentallyby minor ac-
celerations. Also, the experimental crashes showed that frangible switches ‘
may not function even though the structure adjacent to the switch was
heavily &unaged.
The proposed system ceabe modified from the arrangement shown in
this report to meet the special needs of various airplane configurations.
The method used to detect dangerous damage in each of the airplane com-
ponents described here canbe employed for the corresponding components
in any airplane. However, the nwiber of damage detector elements and their
position on the airplane can vsxy according to the airplane design.
In order to provide an extra margin of safety in airplanes carrying
crash-fire protection, it would be desirable to have means for restoring
the fuel end oil flow to the engines after the crash-fire system has func-
tioned. In this way, tl+ecrew can restart any engine, if in their opinion
the degree of engine damage and the nature of the emergency warrant a
restart.
Lewis Flight Propulsion Ikboratory
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Clevelandj Ohio, July2, 1956
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